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DEFINING TORTURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITIQUE
OF THE CONCEPT EMPLOYED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ANTHONY CULLEN*
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to critique the concept of torture employed
by the European Court of Human Rights. Part I highlights the absolute char-
acter of the prohibition against torture and explicates the definition provided
by the United Nations Convention against Torture. Part II deconstructs the
concept of torture employed by the European Court of Human Rights, con-
centrating on the standard setting case of Ireland v. United Kingdom.' As-
serting that the Court's notion of torture is too narrow, Part III proposes an
approach similar to the one employed by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee. Ultimately, Part IV emphasizes the need for a less definitive,
broader view of the concept of torture, and draws attention to the restrictive
nature of the notion currently employed by the Court.
I. THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE AND ITS CONCEPTUALIZATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 5 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment."' Since the adoption of the
UDHR on December 10, 1948, this provision has been reproduced in several
other international human rights instruments. For example, Article 5(3) of
the American Convention on Human Rights replicates the formula with the
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1. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980).
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Part I, at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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appendage that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."3 In addition, Article 7
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") in-
cludes the provision of the UDHR, specifying that "[i]n particular, no one
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experi-
mentation." Finally, The Convention on the Rights of the Child,5 and the
European Convention on Human Rights6 also reproduce, with minor
changes, the wording of Article 5 of the UDHR.' With all international in-
struments containing a provision prohibiting torture, enforcement against it
is absolute. Thus, under no circumstances can a state party legitimately
derogate from the obligations incurred by this provision.8
The prohibition of torture contained in the above-mentioned instruments
represents a codification of a norm of jus cogens or customary international
law. The proscribing of torture as a peremptory norm of international law is
illustrated by the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Furundzija case:
It should be noted that the prohibition of torture laid down in human rights
treaties enshrines an absolute right, which can never be derogated from,
not even in time of emergency .... This is linked to the fact.., that the
prohibition on torture is a peremptory norm or jus cogens.... This prohi-
bition is so extensive that States are even barred by international law from
expelling, returning or extraditing a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.'
3. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered
into force July 18, 1978).
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPRI.
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted without vote Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
1448, 1470, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc.
A/Res./44/25 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
6. Eurpoean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights].
7. The European Convention on Human Rights reproduces the U.N. Declaration formula
in its Article 3 but omits the word "cruel." Id. art. 3. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child contains the provision with the term "child" substituted for "one." Convention on the
Rights of the Child, supra note 5, art. 37. Article 39 of this convention also uses the terms
contained in the United Nation's provision: "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures
to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim
of... torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
art. 39.
8. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 15; ICCPR, supra
note 4, art. 4.
9. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, 144
(1998) (italics added) (citations omitted). All ICTY cases are available from the ICTY's web-
site at http://www.icty.org.
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Stating, "there exists today universal revulsion against torture" the
ICTY asserted that this "has led to a cluster of treaty and customary rules on
torture acquiring a particularly high status in the international, normative
system."'" The European Court of Human Rights adopted a similar position:
Within the Convention system it has long been recognised that the right
under [Article] 3 not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment enshrines one of the fundamental values of de-
mocratic society. It is an absolute right, permitting of no exception in any
circumstances.'
As a principle of jus cogens, the prohibition of torture is among the
strongest norms of international law. The ICTY emphasized this point:
Because of the importance of the values it protects, this principle has
evolved into a peremptory norm orjus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a
higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even "ordi-
nary" customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this higher
rank is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by States
through international treaties or local or special or even general customary
rules not endowed with the same normative force."
To clarify the concept of torture, it is useful to examine the definition
provided by Article 1 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("UNCAT"):
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimina-
tion of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the insti-
gation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.13
10. Id. 1 147.
11. AI-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 11, 1 29
(2001) (citation omitted).
12. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment,
153 (1998) (citation omitted).
13. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535, G.A. Res. 39/46,
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). The definition of
torture provided by Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention of Torture,
although broader in scope, is modeled on Article 1 of UNCAT:
For the purposes of this Convention, torture shall be understood to be any act in-
tentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on
a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as per-
sonal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose.
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This is the first definition of torture to be expressed in a convention. The
wording derives from a similar provision in the U.N. Declaration against
Torture.14 The definition is used by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the ICTY and has been referred to on a number of occasions in
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights."
It is possible to discern four cardinal features of the above definition
that characterise constitutively the meaning of torture in international human
rights law.'6 The first, and perhaps most distinguishing feature, concerns the
severity of the treatment or punishment inflicted.'7 Generally, in international
human rights law, for an act to constitute torture it must cause a certain de-
gree of mental or physical pain or suffering." This is reflected in the juris-
prudence of the ICTY,"9 the European Court of Human Rights" and the Hu-
man Rights Committee.' The severity of pain or suffering is thus commonly
understood as a "distinguishing characteristic of torture that sets it apart
from similar offences. '22
Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended
to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental ca-
pacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish.
The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering that
is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do
not include the performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in this ar-
ticle.
Inter-American Convention for the Prevention of Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, art. 2, 25 I.L.M. 519,
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987).
14. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GOAR,
30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
15. See, for example, its use by the Court in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No.
35763/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 11, 29 (2001).
16. See AMNEsTY INT'L, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 13-14 (London: Amnesty Int'l Publi-
cations, 1984).
17. Id.
18. One notable exception to this criterion is the Inter-American Convention for the Pre-
vention of Torture. The criterion of severity is omitted from the definition contained in Article
2 of this Convention and the concept is widened to include acts that do not necessarily result
in pain or suffering: "Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person
intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental ca-
pacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish." Inter-American Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Torture, supra note 13, art. 2.
19. See Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judg-
ment, 468 (1998) (commonly known as the "Celebici case" because it arises out of events
which occurred at a detention facility in the village of Celebici).
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. See United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, U.N. CCPR
44th Sess., 1138th mtg. 5 (1992) reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and Gen-
eral Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
HRIIGEN/l/rev.5 (2001) [hereinafter General Comment 20].
22. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al., ICTY Case No. IT-98-30/1, Trial Chamber Judgment,
142 (2001).
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The level of intensity required by the definition is unclear.23 Conse-
quently, it is problematic to distinguish the threshold of sufficient severity
without referring to the victim's point of view. According to Chris Ingelse,
[i]n view of the way in which the provision is formulated, only the victim
himself can bear witness to the pain and its intensity. The effect that the
action has on the victim is also determinative for the question as to
whether torture has occurred. The intention of the person inflicting the
pain is, at least for the subjective perception of its intensity, irrelevant ....
[T]his offers few clues on which to base an objective conclusion.24
Although the term "severe" is vague and open to interpretation,' to in-
clude a specific threshold of pain or suffering in the definition would argua-
bly result in an excessive limitation on its application.2 6 The experience of
the victim is of primary consideration in determining acts that constitute tor-
ture. Exclusive use of objective criteria in assessing such ill-treatment over-
looks the fact that pain and suffering are fundamentally subjective, thus, the
victim's perspective needs to be taken into account. 27
The second feature of torture is that, either by act or omission, it is in-
flicted intentionally. 28 If the ill-treatment results from incidental neglect,
such as forgetting to feed prisoners, then it does not constitute torture. It may
be possible for such acts to be characterised as cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. However, if an act is to be characterised as torture, a necessary
ingredient is the perpetrator's deliberate intention to inflict pain or suffering.
The third feature is the purpose of the treatment or punishment;29 it must
be inflicted in view of achieving a specific objective, such as obtaining in-
formation. The term "for such purposes as" indicates that the purposes men-
tioned within the Convention's definition are not exhaustive?' Although
Burgers and Danelius, who participated in the drafting of the Convention,
state that the phrase "for such purpose as" qualifies acts as being similar or
23. The travaux pr paratoires of UNCAT does not shed light on this issue. See J.
HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE:
A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 117-18 (1988).
24. CHRIS INGELSE, THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 209
(2001).
25. See discussion of Ireland v. United Kingdom infra pp. 39-42.
26. According to one commentator, to say generally "how severe or aggravated inhuman
treatment has to be for it to amount to torture is virtually impossible." NIGEL RODLEY, THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 98 (2d ed. 1999).
27. This point will be returned to again with the discussion of the Ireland v. United
Kingdom case where it will be argued that the threshold of suffering was set at an excessively
high level by the Court. See discussion infra pp. 39-42.
28. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 16, at 13-14.
29. Id.
30. See INGELSE, supra note 24, at 209.
2003]
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connected to those mentioned in the Convention,3 this is not how it is now
interpreted.32 Indeed, the ICTY stated in its judgment in the Celebici case,
the examples given "do not constitute an exhaustive list, and should be re-
garded as merely representative."33
The fourth feature of torture concerns its official character?4 Under the
definition, torture is only recognized if it is committed "at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting
in an official capacity. 33 Although the Convention is directed primarily
against actions of state officials, the wording of the definition is broad
enough to effectively include some actions by private individuals.36 Never-
theless, the requirement of a state actor's involvement imposes a serious re-
striction on the application of the definition. It was considered recently by
the ICTY to be "inconsistent with the application of individual criminal re-
sponsibility for international crimes found in international humanitarian law
and international criminal law."37
The four above-mentioned features articulate cardinal aspects of how
torture is generally conceived in international law.3" Attention will now be
turned to how the concept is employed by the European Court of Human
31. According to Burgers and Danelius, for ill treatment to qualify as torture its purpose
must have "some--even remote--connection with the interests or policies of the State and its
organs." BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 23, at 119.
32. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al., ICTY Case No. IT-98-30/1, Trial Chamber
Judgment, 119 (2001).
33. Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
470 (1998).
34. See INGELSE, supra note 24, at 210 (citation omitted).
35. Id.
36. According to Ingelse,
[t]he wording of the requisite relationship with the government is so broad in the
Convention (notably the term acquiescence) that there are many ways to ensure
that a wide range of actions committed by private persons are covered by the op-
eration of the Convention, if the state in some way or other permits such activities
to continue.
Id.
37. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al., ICTY Case No. IT-98-30/1, Trial Chamber Judgment,
139 (2001). It ought to be noted also that the definition of torture provided by Article 7(2)(e)
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court does not include the requirement of
state actor: '"Torture' means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except
that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to,
lawful sanctions." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art.
7(2)(e), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1005, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/9 (1998); Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al.,
ICTY Case No. IT-98-30/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, 139 n. 296 (2001).
38. Although there is considerable overlap with both international humanitarian law and
international criminal law, it ought to be noted that the prerequisites of torture in these fields
are not identical to those contained in the Convention against Torture. For example, the ICTY
(since the Kunarac Judgment), does not require under international humanitarian law the in-
volvement of an official for an act to constitute torture.
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Rights. In doing so, problems arising from the Court's interpretation of the
severity of treatment or punishment required for torture will be highlighted.
II. TORTURE AS DEFINED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights states, "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment."'39 According to the European Court of Human Rights,
[i]n determining whether a particular form of ill-treatment should be quali-
fied as torture, consideration must be given to the distinction, embodied in
[Article] 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treat-
ment. As noted in previous cases, it appears that it was the intention that
the Convention should, by means of this distinction, attach a special
stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suf-
fering [citation omitted]. In addition to the severity of the treatment, there
is a purposive element, as recognised in the United Nations Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, which came into force on 26 June 1987, which defines torture in
terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim
inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating.id
The Court first employed this concept of torture in the case of Ireland v.
United Kingdom." This case is of particular significance to the present dis-
cussion for two reasons. First, it introduced the notion that a minimum level
of severity is required for acts of ill-treatment to constitute torture. Prior to
the judgment in Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Commission on
Human Rights defined the meaning of Article 3's terms in the Greek case:
The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliber-
ately causes suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situa-
tion is unjustifiable.
The word "torture" is often used to describe inhuman treatment, which has
a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the in-
fliction of punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman
treatment. Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be de-
grading if it grossly humiliates him before others, or drives him to an act
against his will or conscience. 2
Although torture is considered in the Greek case to be an "aggravated
from of inhuman treatment," the Court did not make explicit that a threshold
of pain or suffering is required for an act to constitute torture. Second, Ire-
land v. United Kingdom is significant because the Court differentiated more
39. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 3.
40. Atkas v. Turkey, App. No. 24351/94, 313 (2003) available at http://www.echr.coe.
int (citation omitted).
41. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 1 167 (1980).
42. Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention
on Human Rights, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 270 n.51 (quoting The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur.
Conv. on H.R. 186 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)).
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distinctly the meaning of each of the terms contained in Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court has utilized this ap-
proach, placing emphasis on severity of suffering in the concept of torture,
on a number of different occasions, including in Ci~ek v. Turkey,43 Aydin v.
Turkey," Selmouni v. France,45 H.L.R. v. France," Aksoy v. Turkey,47 the
Guzzardi case," the Campbell and Cosans case49 and Akta v. Turkey.'
The Irish government submitted an application to the European Com-
mission on Human Rights on December 16, 1971, alleging a number of vio-
lations of the European Convention on Human Rights by the United King-
dom.' The present analysis confines itself to those aspects of the Court's
judgment concerned with violations of Article 3.
Article 3 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."'52 Its violation in Ireland v. United
Kingdom concerned the torture of prisoners by British security forces for the
purpose of extracting information. The security forces' practice of "interro-
gation in depth" involved the use of the following five techniques:
(a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some
hours in a "stress position," described by those who underwent it as being
"spreadeagled against the wall, with their fingers put high above the head
against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to
stand on their toes with the weight of the body mainly on the fingers";
(b) hooding: putting a black or navy coloured bag over the detainees'
heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except during in-
terrogation;
(c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the detainees
in a room where there was a continuous loud and hissing noise;
(d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving the detain-
ees of sleep;
43. Ciqek v. Turkey, App. No. 25704/94, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 154, 172 (2003).
44. Aydin v. Turkey, App. No. 23178/94, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 251, 82 (1998).
45. Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403, 88 (1999).
46. H.L.R. v. France, App. No. 24573/94, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 35 (1997).
47. Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 63 (1997).
48. Guzzardi v. Italy, App. No. 7367/76, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 333, 1 107 (1981).
49. Campbell and another v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7511/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293,
27 (1982).
50. Atkas v. Turkey, App. No. 24351/94, 313 (2003) available at
http://www.echr.coe.int.
51. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 148 (1980).
The Irish Government alleged violations of Articles 1, 3, 5, 6 and 14 in its original application
to the European Commission on Human Rights. Id.
52. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 3.
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(e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced
diet during their stay at the centre and pending interrogations.53
The opinion of the Court was that the application of the above five tech-
niques for the purpose of interrogation, although inhuman and degrading, did
not amount to torture.' The Court decided that the suffering inflicted
through the use of the techniques was not of sufficient severity to constitute
torture." The Court used the terms contained in Article 3 as a way of distin-
guishing the ill-treatment suffered by the prisoners from the "special stigma"
attached to the actual practice of torture:
In order to determine whether the five techniques should also be qualified
as torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction, embodied in Arti-
cle 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment.
In the Court's view, this distinction derives principally from a difference
in the intensity of the suffering inflicted.
The Court considers in fact that, whilst there exists on the one hand vio-
lence which is to be condemned both on moral grounds and also in most
cases under the domestic law of the Contracting States but which does not
fall within Article 3 of the Convention, it appears on the other hand that it
was the intention that the Convention, with its distinction between "tor-
ture" and "inhuman or degrading treatment," should by the first of these
terms attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very
serious and cruel suffering.56
The Court thus distinguished torture by its level of intensity and charac-
terized torture as "deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and
cruel suffering." Article 1(2) of Resolution 3452 (XXX), adopted unani-
mously by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9,
1975, clarifies this point: "Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."57 The Court
concludes this point with the following statement:
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was
the extraction of confessions, the naming of others and/or information and
although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of
53. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 196 (1980). See
also SIR EDMUND COMPTON, REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE
SECURITY FORCES OF PHYSICAL BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARISING OUT OF EVENTS ON
THE 9TH AUGUST 1971 ch. VII (Her Majesty's Stationary Office 1971) available at
http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uklhmso/compton.htm. For narrative accounts of the practice, written
by the detainees, see FATHER DENIS FAUL & FATHER RAYMOND MURRAY, THE HOODED MEN:
BRITISH TORTURE IN IRELAND AUGUST, OCTOBER 1971 4-78 (1974).
54. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 167 (1980).
55. "[T]he severity of the suffering that [the five techniques] were capable of causing did
not attain the particular level inherent in the notion of torture as understood by the Court." Id.
174.
56. Id. 167.
57. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 14, at 91.
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the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so un-
derstood.58
This position of the Court has been widely criticized for the narrowness
of its application of Article 3.59 In distinguishing the treatment of prisoners
as "inhuman and degrading treatment" but not torture because of its inten-
sity, the Court set aside the unanimous decision of the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights that Article 3 is violated by the application of the five
techniques as form of torture. According to the Commission,
the systematic application of the techniques for the purposes of inducing a
person to give information shows a clear resemblance to those methods of
systematic torture which have been known over the ages.... [T]he Com-
mission sees in them a modem system of torture falling into the same
category as those systems which have been applied in previous times as a
means of obtaining information and confessions. 60
The Commission's definition of torture, as an "aggravated form of in-
human treatment,' 6' does not differ substantively from that which the Court
refers to in Article 1(2) of General Assembly Resolution 3452 (XXX).62 How
then did the Court come to a conclusion so different from that of the Com-
mission? This is a difficult question to answer. The Court's explanation says
substantively little more than the treatment was not severe enough, nor was
the suffering sufficiently intense for it to be characterized as torture. 63 Given
that the Commission's decision on Article 3 was unanimous, and the fact
that it was not contested by either party," this simple rationalization of the
Court's position appears peculiar. Indeed, the Court possessed no informa-
tion that the Commission did not have at its disposal during its deliberation
58. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 1 167 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Michael O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers Under the European
Convention on Human Rights: Ireland v. United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 674, 684-88
(1977); R.J. Spjut, Note, Torture Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 73 AM.
J.INT'L L. 267, 270 (1979); RODLEY, supra note 26, at 90-95; AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 16,
at 13-17.
60. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 402
(1976) [hereinafter Report].
61. Id. at 377.
62. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (separate
opinion of Judge Evrigenis). Article 1(2) states that "[tlorture constitutes an aggravated and
deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Bring Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 14, art. 1(2).
63. Nigel Rodley rightly describes the justification offered by the Court as "unsatisfac-
tory reasoning from an authoritative judicial body." RODLEY, supra note 26, at 92.
64. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Zekia) ("I entertain a lot of doubt whether the Court is justified in setting
aside a unanimous conclusion of the Commission in respect of torture which has not been
contested by the representatives of the two High Contracting States who took part in the pro-
ceedings before the Court.").
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and although it had the power to directly re-examine evidence and to call
witnesses, it did not do so.
According to the Court's reasoning, it is possible to predicate all but one
of the four prerequisites of torture to the five techniques. First, the purpose
of the five techniques, as stated by the Court, "was the extraction of confes-
sions, the naming of others and/or information."' 'Second, that the tech-
niques were used "systematically" to achieve the purpose of extracting in-
formation, demonstrates the perpetrators' intention to deliberately cause pain
and suffering. Third, the Court recognized the official character of the mem-
bers of the security forces in Northern Ireland that carried out the acts."
Thus, it is the absence of sufficiently severe pain or suffering in the applica-
tion of the five techniques that prevents this method of interrogation, in the
opinion of the Court, from being categorized as torture.
Given the lack of explanation offered by the Court for its position, it
could be argued that the Court did not fully engage with the findings of the
Commission. It is worth noting the fact that the Respondent had invited the
Court to adhere to these findings.67 It is also worth considering that amounts
ranging from £10,000 to £25,000 sterling had been awarded to each of the
fourteen prisoners who were subjected to the five techniques."' Arguing that
the use of the five techniques as a method of interrogation did in fact consti-
tute torture, Judge Zekia stated in a separate opinion that "the amounts
awarded constitute a strong indication of the degree of severity and the in-
tensity and length of the suffering caused to the recipients."'69
The concept of torture contained in the Ireland v. United Kingdom
judgment is one that requires extreme intensity of pain or suffering. It is sig-
nificant in this regard that a subjective test, assessing the ill-treatment from
the point of view of the victim, was not applied by the Court, which chose
not to call witnesses." This further underlines the arbitrary basis for the
Court's decision. By not engaging with the victims' point of view, the Court
overlooked a fundamental aspect of how to assess the severity of ill-
treatment.' It also merits attention that by defining torture primarily in terms
of its physical intensity the practice of torture is narrowly conceived by the
Court so that it does not include acts that are not exceptionally brutal. In re-
action to the Court's decision, Amnesty International stated "[o]ur organisa-
65. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 1 167 (1980).
66. "[T]he five techniques were taught orally by the English Intelligence Centre to mem-
bers of the RUC at a seminar held in April 1971. There was accordingly a practice." Id. 1 166.
67. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (separate
opinion of Judge Zekia).
68. According the Commission, "no self-respecting Government faced with similar alle-
gations against its security forces would pay money to persons... unless [they] were con-
vinced of the guilt of the security forces." Report, supra note 60, at 370.
69. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (separate
opinion of Judge Zekia).
70. The importance of a subjective test is emphasized by Judge Zekia. Id.
71. See discussion supra Part II.
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tion must continue to combat torture anywhere in the world and that task
makes it impossible for us to follow the restrictive standard set by the
Court."72 An implication of the Court's judgment is that the concept of tor-
ture can only be conceived in terms of particularly barbaric behavior.73
According to the Special Rapporteur on Torture, the five techniques
used during interrogation "can only be described as torture, which is not sur-
prising given their advanced purpose, namely, to elicit information, implic-
itly by breaking the will of the detainees to resist yielding up the desired in-
formation."74
A factor that commentators use to explain the Court's reasoning is its
concern with the outcome of its decision. If the Court decided the five
techniques constituted torture, the "special stigma" attached to such a viola-
tion could further anger the Catholic community in Northern Ireland, result-
ing in the heightening of hostilities against the security forces. According to
one commentator, "recognizing that a finding of torture would have been at-
tended by public antipathy toward the perpetrators, the Court allowed its
concern with the consequences of its decision to determine its definition of
torture."76
A principle that helps to illuminate how the Court's reasoning differs so
much from that of the Commission is that of the margin of appreciation. In
cases where a state derogates from the Convention, a margin of appreciation
is granted on the understanding that the Respondent is in a better position
72. RODLEY, supra note 26, at 93 (quoting News Release, Amnesty International, Al In-
dex NWS 02/04/78 (Jan. 19, 1978)).
73. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (dis-
senting opinion of Judge Evrigenis):
The Court's interpretation in this case seems also to be directed to a conception of
torture based on methods of inflicting suffering which have already been overtaken
by the ingenuity of modem techniques of oppression. Torture no longer presup-
poses violence, a notion to which the judgment refers expressly and generically.
Torture can be practised-and indeed is practised-by using subtle techniques de-
veloped in multidisciplinary laboratories which claim to be scientific. By means of
new forms of suffering that have little in common with the physical pain caused by
conventional torture it aims to bring about, even if only temporarily, the disinte-
gration of an individual's personality, the shattering of his mental and pyschologi-
cal [sic] equilibrium and the crushing of his will. I should very much regret it if the
definition of torture which emerges from the judgment could not cover these vari-
ous forms of technologically sophisticated torture. Such an interpretation would
overlook the current situation and the historical prospects in which the European
Convention on Human Rights should be implemented.
Id.
74. Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Com-
mission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/37 B, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 8(a) 121, U.N. Doc, E/CN.4/1997/7 (1997).
75. See Spjut, supra note 59, at 270-71.
76. Id.
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than the Court to judge the situation in a state of emergency." In the case of
Ireland v. United Kingdom, the Respondent state had officially derogated
from its obligations under the European Convention using Article 15." Al-
though derogation does not extend to Article 3,"9 it is useful to consider the
Court's use of the margin of appreciation when attempting to grasp the terms
of its reasoning."
The European Commission on Human Rights defined the margin of ap-
preciation as "a certain measure of discretion in assessing the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation."8 In the context of the Ireland v.
United Kingdcm case, the Court made it quite clear that it was giving a wide
margin of appreciation to the Respondent state:
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility
for "the life of [its] nation," to determine whether that life is threatened by
a "public emergency" and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting
to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous con-
tact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in
principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both
on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of
derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter Article 15(1) leaves those
authorities a wide margin of appreciation."
77. See generally Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Re-
visiting the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 625 (2001).
78. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980). Arti-
cle 15(1) of the European Convention states:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under
this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 15(1).
79. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 15(2) ("No derogation
from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles
3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.").
80. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 214
(1980).
It is certainly not the Court's function to substitute for the British Government's
assessment any other assessment of what might be the most prudent or most expe-
dient policy to combat terrorism....
Adopting, as it must, this approach, the Court accepts that the limits of the mar-
gin of appreciation left to the Contracting States by Article 15 para. 1 were not
overstepped by the United Kingdom[.]
Id.
81. Greece v. United Kingdom 2 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174-76 (1960) (Commission
report).
82. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 207 (1980)
(emphasis added). For an overview of how the doctrine of margin of appreciation has been
applied by the Court see generally Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the
20031
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According to Judge O'Donoghue, "the Court has strained beyond break-
ing point their conception of the margin of appreciation in Respondent's fa-
vour."83 He further emphasized the principle's abuse by asserting "the invo-
cation of [the margin of appreciation] in favour of the Respondent
Government has been treated by the Court... as a blanket exculpation for
many actions taken which cannot be reconciled with observance of the obli-
gations imposed by the Convention."" These strong words are expressed in
the context of criticizing the Court's decision on Article 3.
III. REDEFINING THE CONCEPT OF TORTURE
The previous section argued that the concept of torture applied by the
European Court of Human Rights in the Ireland v. United Kingdom case is
excessively narrow. In this section the need for a broader, less definitive in-
terpretation of torture is emphasized.
In redefining the concept of torture to include such methods of interro-
gation as the five techniques, an inquiry into the intended meaning of Article
3 is useful for the purpose of clarifying its scope. The concept of torture used
by the Court in Ireland v. United Kingdom appears to be inconsistent with
the travaux pr~paratoires of the European Convention on Human Rights."
The drafters of the Convention intended the terms used in Article 3 to widen
the scope of its application rather than narrow it.8" The delegate from the
United Kingdom, Mr. Cocks, put forward an amendment including the pro-
hibition of "imprisonment with such an excess of light, darkness, noise or
silence, as to cause mental suffering."87 This amendment was withdrawn
only after it was agreed that the wording of the Article 3, similar to that of
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 ZEITSCHRiFr FUR AUSIANDISCHES
OFFENTLIcHEs RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 240.
83. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (separate
opinion of Judge O'Donoghue).
84. Id. O'Donoghue also remarks:
It must be stated again that, while the evidence of the applicant Government was
quite properly subjected to rigorous cross-examination, the same attitude was not
displayed to all the witnesses for the respondent Government. Here was a lamenta-
ble lack in the manner adopted in carrying out a searching and even-handed inves-
tigation.
Id. He further stated, "I find nothing even approaching disapproval by the Court at the non-
cooperative attitude of the respondent Government." Id.
85. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (sepa-
rate opinion of Judge Evrigenis). For the debate that occurred in drafting Article 3 of the
European Convention see 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 116-117
(1985).
86. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (separate
opinion of Judge Evrigenis).
87. Louise Doswald-Beck, What Does the Prohibition of "Torture or Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment" Mean? The Interpretation of the European Commission
and Court of Human Rights, 25 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 24, 33 (1978) (quoting 1
COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 116-17 (1985)).
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Article 5 of the UDHR," would implicitly cover the prohibition of such ill-
treatment.89 It is thus arguable that the Court did not fully engage with the
intended meaning of Article 3 and, consequently, narrowed its scope to ex-
clude acts that the drafters of the Convention would have included under the
concept of torture." The narrowness of the Court's interpretation of the term
is emphasized by Judge Evrigenis, who stated that
[t]he notion of torture which emerges from the judgment is in fact too lim-
ited. By adding to the notion of torture the notions of inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment, those who drew up the Convention wished, following Arti-
cle 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to extend the
prohibition in Article 3 of the Convention-in principle directed against
torture... to other categories of acts causing intolerable suffering to indi-
viduals or affecting their dignity rather than to exclude from the traditional
notion of torture certain apparently less serious forms of torture and to
place them in the category of inhuman treatment which carries less of a
"stigma"-to use the word appearing in the judgment.9'
The concept of torture needs to be broadened to include not only the
meaning intended by the drafters of the Convention, but also to cover a
range of techniques that are continually being developed.92 The notion
should be broadly conceived so that its interpretation may develop in order
to make more effective the prohibition of new, subtle methods of torture.
For R.J. Spjut, the concept of torture propounded by the Court in the
case of Ireland v. United Kingdom appears to be one "limited to extreme
barbarity." 3 Holding a similar position, Barry Klayman remarks that "[iut
would appear that only the most brutal and atrocious behaviour.., could
amount to torture under the court's definition."4 The five techniques were
applied with the intention of either breaking or eliminating the will of a pris-
oner to withhold information. The fact that they do not correspond to more
conventional notions of torture ought to be considered incidental. However,
according to Judge Fitzmaurice the term should only refer to a distinctly
higher order of suffering which is different not only in degree but also in
kind to that experienced as a result of the five techniques: "If the five tech-
niques are to be regarded as involving torture, how does one characterize e.g.
having one's finger-nails torn out, being slowly impaled on a stake through
88. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 5.
89. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 87 at 33.
90. See Barry Klayman, The Definition of Torture in International Law, 51 TEMP. L.Q.
449, 511-12; Doswald-Beck, supra note 87, at 32-33.
91. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (separate
opinion of Judge Evrigenis).
92. See EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 169-71 (1996) (describing modem torture tech-
niques).
93. Spjut, supra note 59, at 271.
94. Klayman, supra note 90, at 498.
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the rectum, or roasted over an electric grid?"' This extremely restrictive use
of the term limits the prohibition of torture contained in Article 3 to stereo-
typical practices and does not take into account the use of new technology.96
In narrowing the scope of Article 3 the Court has excluded from the
concept of torture more subtle methods of interrogation.97 Accordingly, tech-
niques devised by scientists that do not involve physical ill-treatment but are
nonetheless used to extract information no longer qualify as torture. Psycho-
logical and pharmacological methods used by perpetrators are thus not rec-
ognized as torture. The source of the problem here is the stipulation of a
minimum level of intensity of pain or suffering. The terms contained in Arti-
cle 3 were not intended to acquire the specific meanings they have received
from the Court. By distinguishing the different limbs of the formula the
Court has adopted an approach that essentially weakens its application and
stifles the future evolution of the provision. According to Amnesty Interna-
tional,
[t]wo points emerge from the contradictory rulings [of the Court and the
Commission] in the Northern Ireland Case. First, the treatment in law of
torture, whether by definition or in jurisprudence, must keep pace with
modern technology, which is capable of inducing severe psychological
suffering without resort to any overt physical brutality. Second, it is not
necessary to delineate precisely the border between torture and other
forms of ill-treatment in order to condemn a particular act. The prohibition
in international law of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment is as unequivocal as that of torture.98
As previously mentioned, the demarcation in the meaning of terms con-
tained in Article 3 has the effect of narrowing the scope of its application. A
remedy to this may be achieved by adopting an approach similar to that of
the United Nations Human Rights Committee ("Human Rights Committee")
in its application of Article 7 of the ICCPR.'
95. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980) (separate
opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
96. Judge O'Donoghue makes that point that "[olne is not bound to regard torture as only
present in a mediaeval dungeon where the appliances of rack and thumbscrew or similar de-
vices were employed." Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25
(1980) (separate opinion of Judge O'Donoghue).
97. According to one commentator,
[tiorture is become increasing scientific. Alongside physical brutality and mutila-
tions, the use of sophisticated mechanised equipment is becoming more and more
common. A particular cause for concern is the growth of psychological and phar-
macological methods of torture. While once doctors present at an interrogation
were generally there to prevent the victims death, today medical science plays an
active role in improving the torture's techniques.
Herbert Radtke, Torture as an Illegal Means of Control, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND
TORTURE 3, 4-5 (Franz Bockle & Jacques Pohier eds., Miranda Chayton trans. 1978).
98. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 16, at 15.
99. See General Comment 20, supra note 21, T 5.
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The practice of the Human Rights Committee has been to apply the Ar-
ticle as a whole without differentiating the meaning of the terms it con-
tains."° Actions that violate the article are thus not categorized distinctively
as "torture" or "inhuman" or "degrading" treatment. Accordingly, the deci-
sions of the Human Rights Committee generally refer only to violations of
Article 7 and not to its constitutive parts. Article 4 of General Comment 20
describes this approach:
The Covenant does not contain any definition of the concepts covered by
article 7, nor does the Committee consider it necessary to draw up a list of
pfohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different
kinds of punishment or treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature,
purpose and severity of the treatment applied.10 '
This more flexible approach would widen the scope of Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, enabling the Court to proscribe less
conventional methods of torture. Its prohibition would thus be strengthened
without the restriction of the "special stigma" specified by the judgment of
the Ireland v. United Kingdom case.
CONCLUSION
By first explicating the meaning of torture as generally understood in in-
ternational law, and then by examining its application in the case of Ireland
v. United Kingdom, this paper has advanced an argument against the ap-
proach currently employed by the European Court of Human Rights.
It is the position of this paper that the concept applied by the Court in
the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom is too restrictive and not capable of
including more subtle methods of torture. It is also held that the Court's de-
lineation of the meaning of the terms contained in Article 3 is not consistent
with the travaux priparatoires of the Convention and results in the scope of
the article being narrowed. In conclusion, a more flexible approach based on
a broader, less definitive concept of torture is recommended for the effective
enforcement of its prohibition. Without broadening the scope of the concept
of torture to include methods of interrogation such as the five techniques, the
approach employed by the European Court of Human Rights implicitly
weakens the legal protection available to victims. The concept of torture
needs to be redefined in terms that ensure its prohibition is effective, taking
100. See RODLEY, supra note 26, at 96-98.
101. General Comment 20, supra note 21. This General Comment replaces General
Comment 7 which contained a similar provision: "As appears from the terms of this article,
the scope of protection required goes far beyond torture as normally understood. It may not be
necessary to draw sharp distinctions between the various prohibited forms of treatment or
punishment." United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment 7, U.N. CCPR, 16h
Sess. (1982) reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (1992).
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into account developments in the technology employed for torture. If this
does not occur then the concept, as applied by the Court, will continue to ex-
clude an ever-increasing number of cases.
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